All text from Andrea Nolen.

The Creditanstalt was willing to let Kuhn, Loeb & Co. sail in to be a ‘lender of last resort’ to the Austrian government, which was already heavily indebted to the Rothschilds. This gave Kuhn, Loeb & Co. power over the Hapsburgs, and therefore signals that the Rothschilds were willing to share power with Kuhn, Loeb & Co. That’s not an arrangement which any power-broker financial institution enters into lightly.

Understanding Kuhn, Loeb & Co.

One of the most important reasons why WWI happened is a reason that many people in the Anglo-American camp feel uncomfortable talking about: by 1910 British shipping, their famous “carrying trade”, had lost its edge and Imperial German fleets had superseded them. The ramifications of this went beyond the shipping business because the British government relied on income from its empire, which in turn was built on a partnership between the Navy, nationalized East India Co. trading networks, and the insurance market which supported them (Lloyd’s). When British shipping began to fail, many privileged people in London faced losing power and money.

London’s power and money came via Continental Europe. Britain did not become wealthy through trading with her colonies in Asia, Africa and the Caribbean, but by bringing colonial goods to already-developed markets in Continental Europe. When the Germans became better at delivering these goods, all hell broke loose. Desperate British shipping tycoons– many of whom were not ethnically English, Scottish nor Welsh, but descendants of immigrants to London during the 1780-mid 1800s period– looked to their US allies for salvation. The complicating factor was that the American people wanted nothing to do with these struggling British millionaires and their war.

Back doors were used to get around public distaste for foreign political interference. From at least 1900 interested legislators tried to craft subsidies for the US shipbuilding industry so that it would act in British interests. These attempts were for the most part not successful. The majority of Americans, and the majority of lawmakers, did not wish to chose sides against Germany in this foreign matter. The same went for a great many British subjects, the “tariff reformers” lead by Joseph Chamberlain from 1903, who did not feel that it served British national interests to fight Germany on behalf of these London merchants.

Submarines in the Great Lakes

It has been the understanding of Chester Goetz’s heirs too that their uncle made his fortune from patenting a movie projection device which was then widely adopted. … The reality is different. Leon Goetz never took out a patent on any theater device …

A patent that Leon did take out—when he was just nineteen years old. Leon Goetz patented a submarine escape pod. His patent represents one of the earliest, if not the earliest, historical evidence for the existence of such a safety device.

How a young man from Monroe— a beautiful, landlocked town in Southern Wisconsin— came to have the nautical engineering knowledge to produce such a device is a mystery. I have canvassed a few submarine historians and their consensus is that while Goetz’s device has problems, it was “state of the art” for the 1910s.

Leon Goetz never served in the Navy nor did he work on boats in any capacity. Leon was not an engineering student; he was a theater man, through and through. He did have tenuous connections with the Theodore Roosevelt political machine, however …

The Nonexistent Goetz Projector Patent

Hanson documents another abuse of the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917; conspirators sought to use the act to silence political dissent in Monroe, WI. The abuse was orchestrated by local banker “Mr. Ludlow” and his henchmen “Mr. Young” and “Mr. Neverman”. These three men held hawkish, pro-British views and felt threatened by the more popular Judge Becker and his “America First, Last, and at All Times” stance.

On March 21st 1917, two and a half weeks prior to the US declaration of war, Judge Becker asked the Monroe City Council if he could organize a vote on the war issue as a “means of registering the sentiment toward war in a population comprised so largely of native Swiss or Swiss extraction”. Permission was granted and the procedure was paid for by Judge Becker and his associates (Becker headed the local Peace Committee). On April 3rd 1917 Green County declared 954 to 95 against Congress declaring war under existing conditions. That’s 10 to 1 against war at that time, under current circumstances. The nation had elected then-president Wilson on a pacifist ticket in late 1916; Monroe’s referendum was the only official referendum on this early-1917 war in the United States.

Judge Becker (a Democrat) used the success of the referendum to launch his campaign for Governor of Wisconsin and was supported by Senator Robert M. La Follette (a Progressive Republican). The anti-WWI platform had widespread, bi-partisan support. Becker and La Follette’s populist (and democratic) stance angered pro-war interests on the East Coast: “The Eastern [news]papers cited it [Becker’s referendum] as proof that Wisconsin was Pro-German.” Powerful interests which supported the British Empire and its ‘Great War’ could not ignore equally powerful political statements like Monroe’s referendum, given that the legitimacy of Washington’s actions was supposed to rest on the consent of the people.

The British Connection: Persecuting Judge Becker

A boy from Monroe, WI, found himself working for British Intelligence in NYC during the run up to the USA’s entry into WWI. I can prove Will’s intel connection beyond reasonable doubt by comparing what Will Young said about his own work to what we already know about British “active measures” against the USA at this time.

From the British perspective, there had to be a lot of secrecy about their “active measures”— attempts at influencing public policy through surreptitious means. These measures were mostly aimed at US elites through literary channels, but WWI saw film used too. The British had to tread lightly though, as President Wilson had been elected on a pacifist ticket. The decision he made to enter WWI in 1917 was highly unpopular. Fortunately for London, some members of Wilson’s cabinet were rabidly pro-British and keen to save the Empire irrespective of the wishes of the American people. A great deal of secret, more justly called seditious, politicking went on in support of this goal, particularly from the office of Wilson’s Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, who set up his own intelligence outfit to this end: The Bureau of Secret Intelligence. Belying the bureau’s goofy name, Lansing worked hard to staff his outfit with informants from across the globe and drew on help from his British connections.

William Wesley Young as a British Intelligence Agent